In trying to ensure these basic liberties and goods for all citizens, Rawls has advocated that a state be neutral to different conceptions of the good; furthermore, in order to remain neutral to different conceptions of the good, a state should seek to equalize resources instead of welfare. He has, indeed, compelling arguments for both these stands; however, I argue that in the end these positions are contradictory to his advocacy of primary goods for all. I argue that there are certain situations where some citizens have a legitimate claim for more resources than others, namely those citizens with handicaps and disabilities.

First, I shall outline Rawls's conception of a state's appropriate scope of neutrality. He argues that justice as fairness endorses a political framework whereby the state institutions are neutral in that they do not do anything to promote any particular conception of the good. Secondly, I will show that the next logical step from this idea is that the state does not favor any particular conception of a citizen's well-being, and does not strive to equalize welfare amongst its citizens. Rather, Rawls advocates a political system whereby resources are distributed equally, and citizens can use those resources to pursue their own ends, and their individual conception of the good. Thirdly, I argue that by advocating a system that equalizes resources only, he does not take into account those citizens with disabilities and handicaps whose ability to pursue their goals and aims is greatly reduced. In effect, these disabled citizen's effective amount of liberty is unfairly inadequate, and this infringes upon Rawls's advocacy of primary goods.

1. Rawls's Conception of Neutrality

Rawls argues that in order to allow various reasonable comprehensive doctrines to exist within a pluralistic society, the state must be neutral to various ideas of the good. This is in line with most liberal theories that agree that the state should provide a neutral framework within which different conceptions of the good can be pursued. He acknowledges that states should not favor any one particular comprehensive doctrine and its associated conception of the good, because this would not be in line with his tenants of justice as fairness. Rawls recognizes, however, that there are many ways in which a state can seek to be impartial or neutral.

First of all, he argues, a political system can aim to be procedurally neutral. This kind of system would appeal to a neutral set of values, i.e. it be would impartial to a certain conception of the good, it would be consistent in application of general principles to related cases, etc.. He argues that these neutral values would aim to set the terms for fair procedures, to which citizens can appeal when their claims are conflicting.

However, Rawls argues that by this definition, justice as fairness is not procedurally neutral. He claims that justice as fairness seeks instead to articulate a public basis of justification for the basic structure of a society by extracting tenants from the comprehensive doctrines that already exist within a society. In this sense, justice as fairness seeks to find common ground – or neutral ground – within a pluralistic society, but he points out that this is not the same thing as a system that is procedurally neutral. Rawls argues that within justice as fairness, "government is neutral between different conceptions of the good, not in the sense that there is an agreed public measure of intrinsic value or satisfaction with respect to which all these conceptions come out equal, but in the sense that they are not evaluated at all from a social standpoint."

Within this conception of neutrality, there are still various forms neutrality can take. Rawls argues that one such form is that a state could "ensure for all citizens equal opportunity to advance any conception of the good they freely affirm." Rawls, however, does not endorse this point of view. Clearly, some comprehensive doctrines might be incompatible with the principles of justice. For example, it might be one citizen's conception of the good to overthrow his government in a military coup d'état and establish a dictatorship, but this kind of behavior is clearly not in line with the principles of justice. Therefore, Rawls argues that it is not the role of a state institution to allow this person to advance his/her conception of the good.

Another possible form of neutrality is that the state "would not to do anything that makes it more likely that individuals accept any particular conception rather than another unless steps are taken to cancel, or to compensate for, the effects of policies that do this." This is what Raz defines as "neutral political concern" , or the idea that the state would seek to help all different conceptions of the good equally. This kind of neutrality would dictate that the state should provide equal opportunity to advance all conceptions of the good, and is otherwise known as consequential neutrality. Rawls, however, does not endorse this form of neutrality either. He argues that it is not the place of the state institutions to have an opinion one way or the other on conceptions of the good – and if some comprehensive doctrines slowly become less popular and fade away over time, this is not a loss. He clearly does not seem to have an aversion to letting different comprehensive doctrines compete with one another in what Kymlicka dubs the "cultural marketplace." It is clear that Rawls does not think it unfortunate if weak or degrading conceptions of the good lose popularity and clout in this kind of system.

The third form of neutrality is that the state "would not to do anything intended to favor or promote any particular comprehensive doctrine rather than another, or to give greater assistance to those who pursue it." Raz calls this the "the exclusion of ideals," or the idea that the state does not take a stand on which ways of life are most worth living. This form of neutrality would dictate that the state should not endorse or give favors to certain conceptions of justice. This is otherwise known as neutrality of justification, and Rawls endorses it. He argues that political institutions are not intended to favor any sort of comprehensive doctrine, or any particular conception of the good, but rather should provide a neutral framework. Rawls clearly indicates that no particular concept of the good ought to be favored by a society's political institutions.

Consequently, this idea that a state is not to take a stand on which life-styles are better leads to his arguments on why a state should seek to equalize resources rather than welfare.

2. Equality of Resources

Rawls espouses the view that the state should equalize resources, not welfare. He argues that through a variety of means, including taxation policy, the state could try to arrange the environment (and probably also rely on markets) so as to give people roughly equal shares of resources to use to pursue their life plans. This is radically different from the utilitarian perspective that would argue to equalize welfare, above all. Utilitarians argue that human welfare is ultimately the most important morally relevant aspect of a community and that the state should adhere to this belief. Utilitarians would further argue that the state should not pursue welfare in a collective, but rather should allocate resources in a way that is reflective of the distinctiveness of the individuals.

However, Rawls realizes that some citizens would put excess demands on the state because of the expensive taste they have that are a manifestation of their conception of a good life. To improve their welfare would cost the state more than it would to improve another citizen with less expensive taste's welfare. Rawls, in effect, says "tough luck" to those with expensive tastes, and he argues that those with expensive tastes are not to be subsidized. He maintains that it is the individual's fault if he is not satisfied, and the state should not reward some for their expensive tastes and penalize others for their inexpensive tastes. Each citizen should be responsible for his/her tastes and should not be allowed to demand that society has a role in helping her satisfy these tastes. In other words, it is the individual's responsibility to reconcile his fair share and his preferences. After all, to cater to such demands is potentially to allow the state to be overwhelmed by the unreasonable whims of some, to the detriment of everyone else. Rawls maintains that those citizens with expensive tastes will be forced to revamp and modify their conception of the good to fit into the framework.

The broader argument is that individuals cannot make claims on others to help them fulfill their goals. If the state is seeking to be neutral to different conceptions of the good and therefore neither endorses nor subsidizes any particular conception of the good, then the state should also not play a role in allocating more resources to some conceptions of the good life over others. Daniels argues that Rawls has suggested that individuals "be held responsible for their ends, whereas society is responsible for providing the just framework of all-purpose means within which individuals can pursue their conceptions of the good." In this sense, the state is being neutral to different conceptions of the good, and would be unwilling to give enormous amounts of resources to a few at the expense of many.

3. Rawls's argument that Primary Goods are important for all citizens

This tenant of thought, though, begins to contradict Rawls's endorsement of primary goods for all citizens. Primary goods are that which Rawls defines as basic liberties for all citizens. Rawls's conception of a person's welfare is that there will be a set of goods that most people will consider important regardless of anything else. Rawls argues that primary goods are "things that citizens need as free and equal persons", and include "income and wealth," "the basic liberties," "freedom of movement and the choice of occupation," "powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibility," and "the social basis of self-respect." Fundamentally, Rawls thinks everyone deserves primary goods, and that primary goods are meant to be a means for people to pursue their life goals.

Sen, though, has articulated a fundamental problem: "Since the conversion of these primary goods and resources into freedom to select a particular life and to achieve may vary from person to person, equality in holdings of primary goods or resources can go hand in hand with serious inequalities in actual freedoms enjoyed by different persons." In other words, individuals vary in their ability to convert primary goods into what is really important to them -- namely, the capability and freedom to do what they choose. Some people clearly do not have the capabilities to turn resources into primary goods, especially the primary good that prescribes that everyone should have "freedom of movement and the choice of occupation". It seems that if a state takes primary goods as the appropriate standard of well-being for purposes of justice, people may be treated unfairly.

This is especially true of those with handicaps or disabilities. It is conceivable that someone with a disability would require many more resources to enjoy freedom of movement, and the ability to pursue their choice of occupation among other primary goods. People who suffer from natural disadvantages (disabilities, illnesses, or mental disorders) would most likely require enormous resources to even approach the happiness and well-being of those who are not so disadvantaged. The number of resources they would be able to secure in a system that equalizes resources and not welfare would be insufficient to allow them to live the sort of life they want. The problem here is that by advocating a system that equalizes resources and not welfare, Rawls seriously infringes on a disabled individual's fair share of opportunity. A theory that judges the well-being of individuals by an index of primary social goods ignores the fact that some people in the society might be disabled. As Daniels points out, "given the same index of primary goods, a handicapped or ill individual may not enjoy the same capability set or freedom of choice as someone who is normal." However, because Rawls is unwilling to give enormous amounts of resources to a few at the expense of the many, this implies that he would also be unwilling to subsidize those with disabilities.

However, unlike those who might suffer in a state that equalizes resources because of having expensive tastes, people with disabilities suffer in this state because of their handicap. Those with disabilities are in the unfortunate circumstance of poor brute luck as opposed to poor options luck -- after all, the natural lottery is not someone's fault or a result of a poor choice. As Daniels convincingly argues "the intuition is that whenever we are made worse off through no fault of our own, or as the result of nothing that we could control, then we have a legitimate initial claim on others for assistance or compensation for our misfortune. ... [there are ways] in which individuals with the same primary goods may be made worse off in regard to their opportunity for welfare through no fault of their own."

Daniels also argues that it is important to note that the impairment of normal functioning through disease and disability restricts an individual's opportunity relative to that portion of the normal range his skills and talents would have been made available to him were he healthy. The variability in people keeps them from converting primary goods with equal efficiency into what is primarily of ultimate moral concern -- that is, an individual's freedom and capability to do what they please. Daniels points out that health care is one such institution where equality of resources may not be fair. This seems clear, as different individuals will require different medical treatments, some of which will be more expensive than others.

There are certain arguments that can be made to solve this problem, however, that would not fundamentally threaten Rawls's stances.

First of all, it seems that one attempt at a solution would be a system that would compensate disadvantaged people but not at a rate that would severely affect the amount of resources available to other people. This is quite consistent with Rawls's Difference Principle -- a principle that acts to ensure that those who are the worst off in society will not be worse off than in any other situation. The Difference Principle tries to relieve the effects on those with the worst talents and skills by ensuring that inequalities work to their advantage. Therefore, this system could try to designate a minimal quantity of resources for those who are disabled or handicapped. This is probably not objectionable to Rawls, but nonetheless, is not something he explicitly endorses.

Secondly, another attempt at a solution would be a system that does wholly compensate for those who are disabled, and tries to elevate them to a position as normal functioning members of society, even if this notably effects the amount of resources left for others. This sort of system would attempt to improve people's health until they have normal functioning capabilities, and only then equally distribute resources. Normal functioning capabilities have been defined by Daniels as "the absence of disease, [because] diseases (including deformities and disabilities resulting for trauma) are deviations from the normal functional organization of a typical member of a species."

Although this would seemingly infringe upon Rawls's endorsement of equalizing resources, it is important to note that Rawls has explicitly assumed that all members of the society are normal and functioning. He specifies in Political Liberalism that he is operating under the assumption that citizens are reasonably free and equal: "one aim of the idea of goodness as rationality is to provide part of a framework for an account of primary goods. But to complete this framework that idea must be combined with a political conception of citizens as free and equal. With this done, we then work out what citizens need and require when they are regarded as such persons and as normal and cooperating members of a society over a complete life." Therefore, if we acknowledge that in a society there will undoubtedly be those citizens who are born with natural disabilities and are therefore not "reasonably free and equal", we therefore have the leeway to try to elevate those disabled individuals into a position of being relatively free and equal. The reasoning here is that Rawls has tried to solve the problem of justice for the idealized case that ignores severe variabilities in individuals, but we can extend the solution to more complex cases.

4. Conclusion

Rawls has outlined a system that would seek to promote neutrality amongst different conceptions of the good and would not endorse or subsidize any particular conception of well-being. This system would therefore seek to equalize allocated resources to all citizens, and thus be neutral to different conceptions of the good, and individual citizens could try to use those resources to pursue their aims and goals. However, that said, given the same amount of resources, some individuals will have a severely difficult time converting those resources into well-being, not just because of their expensive tastes, but because of a more legitimate reason -- namely, their disabilities. Rawls does not address this situation where citizens are not normal members of a society, and instead makes the assumption that all members in his system would be fully functioning members.

Rawls, in fact, has not given enough weight to the problems that arise when those with disabilities are not compensated for. He argues, on the one hand, that all citizens deserve certain basic liberties and primary goods, yet he also endorses a system that equalizes resources alone and allows for those with poor brute luck to suffer as a result. Although it is possible that a system could be designed to secure additional resources for those who are handicapped even within a system that generally equalizes resources, Rawls has not specifically endorsed any such view.