On the eve of World War II, France controlled a colonial empire second in size only to that of Britain. It was an empire over twenty times as large as the home country, and it contained one and a half times as many inhabitants. By 1962, only scattered remnants were left. The French had fought long and hard to prevent the loss of their colonies, and the process of decolonization in the French Empire was violent and brutal, especially in Algeria. Why, then, was the French extraction from Algeria so difficult? France's actions were to a great extent the consequence of the imperialist ideas that persisted among the political elite and the public. They believed that France had a humanist colonial vocation and that empire was part of the nation's greatness. After France was decolonized, French society and politics had to readjust their ideologies according to France's new international role. The impact of decolonization of French politics and society was profound.

After WWII, there was a wide spread belief in the value and legitimacy of the French Empire. The French, after all, had strong ties with their colonies and saw many of them as a part of France. Bets, Clayton and Sorum all argue that the decline in France's stature in the world, culminating in its collapse in WWII and its impotence in the immediate postwar period, added a non-rational force to the belief in the legitimacy and value of France's empire. The movement for colonial liberation was seen as another external threat to France. In other words, in the aftermath of WWII, France wanted to secure its position in the international arena and be respected as a legitimate global power. Indeed, opinion polls reveal that when WWII ended, the French people who were used to possessing an empire, expected that it would remain French, and wanted to keep it. In the words of one observer, while public opinion was "ready to accept any transformation, even a radical one, of the colonial system," it was "absolutely not disposed to allow the slightest attempt at secession." (1) Even as late as 1958, a poll showed that 52% of the French people wanted integration, while only 41% wanted Algerian independence. (2)

Even though the public did value the French Empire, Sorum argues that "the elite were more imperialist than the mass of the public." He argues that the public was more concerned with fuel and food shortages, inflation, strikes and political instability than the empire as such. He argues: "the underlying reason for the agony of decolonization, therefore appears to have been the imperialist convictions of the small politically influential segment of the French public." (3) Smith also argues that it was so difficult for France to decolonize not because of French economic interest in Algeria, or even a faulty system of government, but mainly because of a "common perception ... of the French political elite in regard to colonial issues." (4) The French political elite believed that their empire was legitimate because they believed that the West must pacify and educate the "backward" natives, and develop the untapped resources of the world for the benefit of mankind (a.k.a. the white man's burden). After WWI, both the Catholics and the rationalist intellectuals argued that colonization was legitimized by the right of humanity to use for its well-being the material and moral riches of the whole world. Also the spread of the idea of social evolution indicated to them that the industrial civilization of the west was not only the most advanced stage of mankind but also a natural goal of all societies. This was, after all, part of the Jacobean tradition of citizenship. It dictated that France has a mission to spread their civilization not only to Europe, but also to the whole world. Sorum argues that "Jacobean nationalism differed from other brands of nationalism in the intensity of its missionary zeal. This zeal expressed, as well as reinforced, a fundamental vision of France that underlies the divisions and conflicts that have clouded French history." (5)

Obviously, economic factors also influenced metropolitan politics by both direct and indirect means. Business influenced the course of events indirectly by shaping political debates in Paris on the economic value of empire. Perceptions of the costs of a thorough economic disengagement were weighed against a calculation of political benefits and liabilities.

All in all, the French sense of global importance was rooted in their idea of Empire. Smith argues that "the major stake the French had in Algeria was ... their sense of national identity." (6) It therefore can be argued that the French stake in Algeria was at once economic, moral, strategic, and certainly psychological.

For eight years, beginning in 1954, the Algerian War dominated French society and public life. On more than one occasion, the war seemed to threaten the nation with civil war. Although the 4th Republic tried to make various reforms, most historians agree that the reason why it was so difficult for France to give independence to its overseas possessions was because of its faulty system of government. The leaders of the 4th Republic did not have the kind of stability or autonomy that was needed to execute a coherent feasible colonial policy. The French political system was weak, and it divisions badly complicated the reaction to colonial nationalism. The political elite were divided and there differing opinions as to how to end the conflict -- the left and the right were decisively split. The prolongation of the war deepened the tensions within France itself. It led to a worsening of political disagreements and to the weakening of the image of the executive administration.

Thus, De Gaulle came back to power and helped establish the 5th Republic. It is beyond doubt that De Gaulle owed his return to power to the Algerian war. Everyone waited for him to put an end to the conflict. Many French-Algerian supporters believed that de Gaulle was on their side when he came into office, but they were to be proved wrong in the long-term. As de Gaulle wrote in his memoirs, even when he came into office he felt that "there was in his opinion no other solution than that of Algerian self-determination." (7) In the meantime, though, he skillfully blurred the issues and bewildered his opponents. His seemingly incomprehensible zigzagging policy gratified and discouraged each side in turn. Some historians concluded that initially, De Gaulle probably did not have a certain goal for Algeria in mind when he came into office, but instead adjusted his policies according to public opinion.

In the late 1950s, it started to come to light that the French military was using torture against the Algerian rebels. The army officers, like the police, had been resorting to torture as an effective, indeed essential, means of fulfilling their mission. Intellectuals in the late 50s published numerous pamphlets that described graphically the various forms of torture the French soldiers were using against the Algerian rebels. The French population was horrified. Claude Bourdet, editor of France Observateur asked, "is there a Gestapo in Algeria?" (8) At that time, the words "Gestapo" and "Nazi" were not to be used lightly. They abraded wounds that had not yet had time to heal and revived an all too recent past, when Frenchmen had chosen sides against each other and sold each other out. Painfully aware that French troops were behaving like Nazis, they wanted at least to prevent the French people from being guilty, as the German people had been, of silent complicity with these crimes. The French population was upset at the torturer's violation of the humanist principles of the West and at his betrayal of their concept of France.

Sartre was one of these intellectuals who argued that the violence in Algeria was the French people's collective responsibility. He felt that the initial and fundamental violence into the Algerian situation was colonialism itself. He argued that the colonial system was based on violence -- first conquest, the different forms of exploitation and oppression, and then pacification. By its own violence, colonialism had taught the natives to understand only violence. By colonialism's intransigence, it forced the native to resort to violence. He therefore concluded that the French were guilty of narcissism and had to come to terms with their own hypocrisy.

All that said, some historians conclude that the impact of the literature on torture did not sink deep enough into French consciousness, and did not last there very long even thought the French population was shocked and horrified for a time. It is true that the leaders of the protest in the late 50s and early 60s were men and women who lived isolated in Paris and wrote for magazines of the extreme political left. Talbott claims that many of the people who protested against torture later regarded their protest as futile. He points out that the outcry of the spring of 1957 and later did nothing to shorten the war.

The international criticism France started to get in the late 50s did help to shorten the war, however. De Gaulle saw that the situation in Algeria was doing damage to France's international position. In the fall of 1959, the UN was set to discuss Algeria, and the commonwealth, and the Commonwealth countries had decided to abstain or vote against France. Even President Eisenhower planned an official visit to France. International opinion was moving steadily against war in Algeria. By June 1961, France was criticized by the socialist and Arab states, held in suspicion by the UN, and enjoyed only tepid support from the US and the UK. De Gaulle realized that if France wanted to secure its position in the international arena and be respected as a legitimate global power, it had to give Algeria its independence. Thus, De Gaulle granted Algeria its independence in order to secure his own political authority. He took the initiative and acted as a strong executive in control of foreign policy.

This is, therefore, the lasting and most important political impact of the war in Algeria: it is the idea of the president as a autonomous executive who is able to maneuver in the international arena without being bonded to fickle domestic politics. DeGaulle set the precedent for this kid of executive and helped to define the role of the president within the 5th Republic. After all, it sometimes is NOT in a nation's best interest to have a weak executive whose foreign policy is dictated solely by domestic forces. Especially in this century, the political development of most societies has been deeply marked by international politics -- war, imperialism. A strong executive who is able to maneuver somewhat freely in the international arena is the best answer for today's world.

After the French had failed to prevent the loss of their empire, they needed to adjust their vision of France and the world to the fact of decolonization. Kahler argues that "decolonization seemed for the European states the last precipitous act in their decline from world preeminence, leaving doubts about their place in an international world order." (9) This is especially true because the countries were acted upon and were not entirely in control of their situation. What had begun as a riot in a colonial capital had transformed into a change of political regime. Even though the French viewed decolonization as defeat, the intellectuals helped to minimize some of the potentially unpleasant consequences of this view. The humanist intellectual's stress of France's continuing overseas mission hindered the spread of the view that the former subjects were ungrateful people who deserved no further aid from France. It prepared the public to accept de Gaulle's linking of aid to the former colonies with the reassertion of France's "grandeur." Sorum claims that ultimately the French population tried to forget about the war in Algeria as quickly as they could. It wasn't until the early 1970s, a decade after Algerian independence, that the French were willing again to think seriously about the war and its meaning. The French Algerians who had fled to France brought to public attention the injustices done to them at the end of the war by the FLN, the Gaullist, and the French people.

By the late 60s, France had a new identity. The idea of Empire is not as important anymore to the French population as France now sees itself as an essential part of European Integration. After decolonization, France started to form new economic links with the rest of Europe and other nations. But the impact of decolonization can still be seen in French society and French politics. The president is still an autonomous political executive. The French still see themselves as an international upholder of human rights and peace. France therefore, has successfully been redefined politically, economically, and socially.