In the Islamic world, jihad is an expression of revolution. In the text and the Sunna, it is used for a variety of means, mostly as means to preserve Islam as a faith and to convert those who are not peoples of the books (i.e. Jews or Christians). Within the past 20 years, however, this term has been used to justify a variety of actions, both against leaders of Islamic nations and other (seemingly) influential people, as an expression of revolt against oppression. After all, it is only disillusionment that drives people to take up arms against the state. What, then, distinguishes jihad from other types of revolution? Clearly, one could argue that it is to further Islamic ideals. I, however, argue that in specific cases -- especially modern examples -- jihad was mainly waged because of disillusionment stemming from economic hardship. I will use the case of SadatÍs assassination as an example.

I argue that those who assassinated Sadat in what is considered jihad were addressing above all the economic injustices that existed under Sadat. Other Islamic ideology was important only secondly. In this sense, jihad is synonymous with revolution against unjust oppression, and seems to have little to do with preserving Islam itself, if only indirectly. In the case of SadatÍs Egypt, there was wide-spread disillusionment, stemming mainly from poor economic policy. The radical factions of the population used Islamic revolution, and the idea of jihad, as their means to overthrow the government. I argue that although Islamic ideology played a role in the call to jihad against Sadat, it was first and foremost the massÍs poverty and the wide-spread disillusionment that led to his assassination. First I will outline EgyptÍs economic state under Sadat, then I will highlight the lower classes disillusionment, and finally I will argue that it was these conditions above all that led to the call of jihad and the assassination of Sadat.

By 1967, Egypt was economically integrated into the capitalist world market. Nasser had inaugurated a policy of producing and importing more consumer goods, in order to gain support from the middle and upper classes who had been alienated by the regimes socialist policies. Sadat gave this policy more repute by beginning the ñOpen Door Policyî in 1975. SadatÍs decision to allow a measure of capitalism and a free market economy was linked to his political program of liberalization. He thought it was important to integrate Egypt with the West where he thought its future lay.

The Open Door Policy did not, at first, lead to serious economic changes in the country, nor did it create new economic structures. It was, in short, a series of new legislation that was designed to encourage foreign investment. What it seems to have done was to establish and expand a parallel market for foreign exchange, reduce exchange restrictions, reform banking laws, and to some extent decentralize the making of economic decisions. Western consumer goods and living styles, thus, invaded Egyptian society via mass media. Egypt quickly became wide open to foreign investors. Now, in retrospect, it is clear that Egypt was exploited by the West under a gauze of legitimacy that espoused ñprogressiveî ideals such as free markets. Egypt was exporting mostly raw goods and importing mostly manufactured goods, and therefore fell prey to economic disparity because it never had the chance to develop its own industry.

Furthermore, the Open Door Policy increased the participation of the private sector in the economy and thus introduced an element of greater competition for the public sector. Increasingly, the public sector was being dismantled, while the private sector was continuing to flourish. This added to increased inflation (by 1979 the rate was officially admitted to be between 30 and 35 percent, but almost certainly was a good deal more.) By the end of the 70s, Egypt was drowned in debt.

Most importantly, the Open Door Policy led to the rise of an Egyptian bourgeois class that profited from these policies. Haykel named them a ñparasite classî with a ñhigh pattern ... of vulgar consumption.î(1)  The gap between the haves and the have-nots widened significantly during this time. While in 1975 there had been an estimated 500 or so millionaires in Egypt, by 1981 that number had risen to 17,000. This in a country where five million families had to live on the equivalent of less that $30 a month. This while the rest of the population was forced to live off extremely meager public secular salaries. This while the graduating university students had no hope of finding work within Egypt, and were faced with the prospect of either homelessness or emigration. (A)

Heikal observed that ñlife for the ordinary Egyptian men and women was not easy: inflation was not low, the rich were still rich and the poor were still poor.î(2)   This situation was made worse in October of 1976. The IMF began to put overwhelming pressure on Egypt to devalue the Egyptian pound even further, and also to drastically reduce the subsidies given on staple foodstuffs like rice, lentils and sugar, fuel and clothing -- basically, the essentials for life for ordinary citizens. The announcement was made in January 1977, and immediately tens of thousands of men and women poured into the streets. Heikal argues that ñlife had long been [for these people] almost unbearably hard, but [they knew now] they were going to find it impossible.î(3)  There was rioting in all major cities in Egypt. A few days later, Sadat canceled the order, but by then Heikal argues that his legitimacy was already beginning to crack.

In was now when Sadat started to impose his ñIron Fistî. Heikal argues that

Egypt began to conform to a pattern seen in many Third World countries where the ruler has decided to adopt the iron fist of repression. On the surface there is a facade which presents the recognizable attributes of state -- a President, a Prime Minister and a Cabinet, probably a Parliament which meets and even political parties. But none of these represent the real political like of the country. To find that it is necessary to look behind the facade, to go below the surface. It is in the underground that the genuine political movements are to be found; it is here that discontent becomes articulated and that the mechanism to express and remedy grievances is being forged. So it was in Iran in the last years of the Shah. So too it was in Egypt in the last years of Sadat. (4)

It was these heightened social and economic tensions that paved the way for reform and radical factions of society to gain popularity. There were many organizations that called for reform -- and some that advocated jihad. Although there were many Islamic groups that were politically active during the years until SadatÍs assassination, not all were violent. JamaÍat Islamiyya, The Muslim BrotherhoodÍs al-DaÍwa group, and the Jihad Organization were a few of these Islamic groups. While JamaÍat Islamiyya  was a predominantly peaceful organization that sought to provide Islamic solutions to common problems, others like the Military Academy Organization, The Association of Muslims, and the Jihad Organization were violent organizations.

It was the Jihad Organization, and Khaled, who assassinated Sadat in the end. They argued that their fundamental concern was to establish an Islamic society. Their jihad was a struggle for the realization of Islamic ideals, and under the present state of Sadat, those ideals were violated. They argued that the secular state was an apostate state, and it was their duty to wage an individual jihad. Indeed, those that killed Sadat had reasons that were entirely and consistently Muslim. They had obtained a fatwa from a mufti which declared that it was legal to kill a ruler who disobeyed the ordinances of God. Sadat had corrupted Islamic society and so had to die. They were not afraid to die themselves and on the Day of Judgment they were convinced they would be judged solely according to their intentions.

The basic concept of the jihad groups is that the hakimiya, the authority by which men are governed, depends on the baÍya, the consent or approval of the people, and this can only be given to someone who rules in accordance with the sharia, the baÍya being given not to the ruler himself but to the sharia. So if the ruler ceases to obey the sharia it is legitimate to oppose him. In this case he represents the hakimiya of man instead of the hakimiya of God. This gave the jihad groups justification, as they saw it, to move from the realm of ideas to the realm of action. (5)

However, all this said, if the social and economic disparities had not existed within Egypt at that time, regardless of the stateÍs religious affiliations, these organizations would not have had the support of the masses in their claims for jihad. Heikal writes that KhaledÍs reasons for assassinating Sadat ñcould be summed up as the social and economic conditions in the country, the Camp David agreements and government oppression.î(6)  Even though Khaled had, perhaps, the lofty end goal of an Islamic society, was brought him to arms was the economic disparity of his country, and his discontent with SadatÍs policies. In this sense, KhaledÍs jihad is not indistinguishable from other types of revolution, it is merely a term used to justify revolution in an Islamic context.

In conclusion, I do not want to be too extreme and claim that economic disparities were the SOLE reason for SadatÍs assassination. Clearly, those who assassinated him were motivated by Islamic ideals and the dream of a authentic Islamic state. However, if it were not for the economic disparities at that time, jihad would have seemed too extreme and unjustified to most Egyptians. The fact that the masses were suffering under economic hardship paved the way for social mal-content, and in modern Islamic society, this seems a pre-requisite for jihad -- or at least, a legitimate jihad. Now, granted, there have been many religious fundamentalists who have called for jihad on many occasions where it is not clear that economic disparity has played an important role, but in these cases their legitimacy is called into question. Undoubtedly, these individuals are not supported by most Muslims, and in fact, most Muslims have a serious problem with associating their jihad with any notion of Islam. In the case of Sadat, though, disillusionment was widespread, and it seems that most Egyptians understood his assassination as a legitimate jihad. The fact remains that few Egyptians came onto the street to mourn Sadat, and most welcomed his disappearance, and in a sense, this seems to legitimize the assassination more than anything else.

(A) About 2 million Egyptian fellahin migrated to other Arab nations to make money because they had no prospects in Egypt itself.
(B) For example, while the Sheik Shaltout had decreed that a vital element in the conflict between Israel and the Arabs was religious because of Jerusalem, his successor was obliged to issue a fatwa stating that the Camp David agreements and peace with Israel were wholly in accordance with the teachings of Islam.

(1) Hopwood, Derek. Egypt, Politics and Society (New York: Harper Collins), 1982, p. 166
(2) Heikal, Mohamed. Autumn of Fury (New York: Random House), 1983, p.103
(3) IBID, p. 91
(4) IBID, p. 113
(5) IBID, p. 270
(6) IBID, p. 246

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